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I. INTRODUCTION
With respect to current and future warfare, it is virtually impossible to 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
use a host of weapons, munitions, and systems that function through the 
operation of highly sophisticated information systems.1  For instance, the 
command and control of operational forces are increasingly coordinated and 
directed through computer-based networks that allow for real-time sharing of 
information and common pictures of the battlespace.2  Moreover, logistics, at 
all levels of warfare, are entirely at the mercy of information systems.  And, of 
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 1. COMM. ON OFFENSIVE INFO. WARFARE, NAT?L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT?L ACADS.,
TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS REGARDING U.S. ACQUISITION AND USE OF 
CYBERATTACK CAPABILITIES 9 (William A. Owens et al. eds., 2009). 
2. Id.
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course, in recent years the development of cutting edge, high-tech cyber 
weapons allow for an attack against an adversary in both virtual and real 
domains.3 ?????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????
the legal framework applicable to the conduct of such operations, the traditional 
normative legal structure for warfare, the jus ad bellum4 and the jus in bello,5
still regulate the actions of belligerents engaged in cyber hostilities. 
This article deals with legal issues in the cyber warfare context related to 
the jus in bello, which is also referred to as international humanitarian law 
(IHL).  The international legal community acknowledges and widely accepts 
that IHL applies to cyber operations undertaken in the context of an armed 
conflict.6  The challenge, of course, is not that IHL applies, but rather how it 
specifically applies to cyber operations.  Unquestionably, digital means and 
methods of warfare executed in both the virtual and real world pose novel 
issues.7  In this regard, it is necessary to consider and examine how pre-cyber 
IHL laws, as well as the values that formed the foundation for those laws,8
translate into regulation of armed conflicts in the New Age of Cyber.  Although 
there are many issues and topics that are worthy of such a re-examination, few 
are as controversial as the notion of belligerent reprisals under IHL.  
As will be discussed in detail below, a belligerent reprisal under IHL is a 
method of warfare that is otherwise unlawful but, in exceptional cases, is lawful 
when used as an enforcement mechanism in response to unlawful enemy acts.9
As noted by Professor William Schabas, ???????????????????? ???????????????
that crimes are justifiable as a proportionate response to criminal acts 
committed by the other party.  In a sense, it is the most ancient means of 
3. Id. at 10. 
4. Jus ad bellum addresses when a State may use force under international law. What are Jus ad 
bellum and Jus in bello? INT?L COMM. RED CROSS, https://www.icrc.org/en/document/what-are-jus-
ad-bellum-and-jus-bello-0 [https://perma.cc/7AP3-7D8M] (last visited Nov. 7, 2017).  Some legal 
commentators have observed that the United Nations Charter creates a legal regime more accurately 
characterized as jus contra bellum because it is fundamentally devised to prevent the use of force. See
ROBERT KOLB & RICHARD HYDE, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ARMED 
CONFLICTS 13 (2008). 
5. The jus in bello regulates the conduct of parties engaged in an armed conflict. See What are 
Jus ad bellum and Jus in bello?, supra note 4. 
6. See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER 
OPERATIONS 3 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2017) [hereinafter TALLINN MANUAL 2.0]. 
7. See, e.g., David Wallace & Shane R. Reeves, The Law of Armed Conflict’s “Wicked” 
Problem: Levée en Masse in Cyber Warfare, 89 INT?L L. STUD. 646, 666?67 (2013) (discussing the 
difficulty of applying the traditional IHL interpretation of a levée en masse in the cyber domain). 
8. HEATHER HARRISON DINNISS, CYBER WARFARE AND THE LAWS OF WAR 239?40 (James 
Crawford & John S. Bell eds., 2012). 
9. 1 JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW: RULES 513 (2005). 
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???????????? ??? ???? ?????10 ?????? ????? ??????????? ?????? ?? ???????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????jus in bello enforcement of the law.  
And, because the enforcement of international law and IHL specifically, is the 
obvious shortcoming with international law, belligerent reprisals may provide 
a timely mechanism to redress enemy violations of IHL during the armed 
conflict itself.11
The use of belligerent reprisal has evolved over time ?from a fundamental 
and nearly universally recognized aspect of the international law? regulating 
warfare ?into a complex and [highly] contentious sanction.?12  Arguably, in 
modern IHL, reprisals have been largely?but not entirely?prohibited by 
customary and codified law.  The 1977 Additional Protocols (AP) I13 is 
??????????????? ???? ?????????????? ???????????? ?????????? ???? ?????
comprehensive condemnation of belligerent reprisals as a method of warfare.  
Commenting on the efforts that led to AP I, Konstantin Obradovic, who took 
part in the Diplomatic Conference of 1974?1977 as a member of the Yugoslav 
delegation, made the following observations about belligerent reprisals:  
With its well-nigh absolute prohibition of reprisals against all 
categories of protected persons who fall into enemy hands, 
Protocol I goes further down the trail blazed in 1949.  The 
underlying considerations are both humanitarian and rational.  
The history of war?and the Second World War in particular?
clearly shows that, apart from being barbarous, unfair and 
inequitable as they invariably victimize the innocent, reprisals 
achieve nothing.  ??????????????????????????????????????????????
enemy violation of the law, they never result in the triumph of 
the rule of law.  Moreover, all the mass executions of the last 
world war, all the Oradour-sur-Glane of this world have not 
????? ??????? ??? ??????? ????????? ?????????????? ??? ????????
Reprisals therefore appear pointless.14
10. GARY D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN 
WAR 693 (2d ed. 2016) (quoting WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A
COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE 496 (2010)).  
11. A.P.V. ROGERS, LAW ON THE BATTLEFIELD 14 (2d ed. 2004).  Importantly, reprisals are 
separate and distinct from acts of retaliation and revenge, which remain unlawful under IHL. 
GEOFFREY BEST, HUMANITY IN WARFARE 19 (1980). 
12. Sean Watts, Reciprocity and the Law of War, 50 HARV. INT?L L.J. 365, 382 (2009). 
13. Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, Jun. 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter 
Protocol I].   
14. Konstantin Obradovic, The Prohibition of Reprisals in Protocol I: Greater Protection for 
War Victims, INT?L REV. RED CROSS, Oct. 31, 1997, at 524, 
https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/article/other/57jnv7.htm  [https://perma.cc/FY6J-
PF9P]. 
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While Obradovic expressed this view at the earliest period in the 
development of cyber capabilities, the current and future state of reprisals in the 
cyber realm require a review of more recent legal analysis.  In that regard, a 
useful starting point for legal practitioners, policymakers, non-governmental 
organizations,15 cyber security professionals, military commanders, and 
scholars is the 2017 Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to 
Cyber Operations (Tallinn Manual 2.0).16  This resource, which is best 
understood as the collective opinions of a group of international experts, 
helpfully addresses the question of belligerent reprisals under IHL in armed 
conflict as well as many other vital issues spanning public international law in 
its nearly 600 pages of highly informative text.17  Impressively, Tallinn Manual 
2.0 has 154 rules including two rules on reprisals: Rule 108, Belligerent 
Reprisals, and Rule 109, Reprisals under Additional Protocol I.18  In addition 
to the actual rules contained in Tallinn Manual 2.0, the manual provides 
detailed commentary, offering some tremendously valuable insights into the 
normative context of the rules as well as practical implications for their 
application.19  Finally, and most importantly, it is important to note that the 
experts who wrote Tallinn Manual 2.0 were limiting themselves to an objective 
restatement of the lex lata and scrupulously avoided including statements 
reflecting the lex ferenda.20
This article critically explores the legal landscape of belligerent reprisals 
and considers whether the use of these measures is a viable enforcement 
mechanism under IHL in the context of cyber operations.  Because of the 
layered approach to this inquiry, the article has seven parts that build upon each 
other.  Part II of the article provides an overview of the history of belligerent 
reprisals under IHL.  Part III discusses belligerent reprisals in the context of 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
belligerent reprisals: the lex lata.  Countermeasures (at one time known as 
peacetime reprisals) under the law of state responsibility forms the basis of Part 
V.  Part VI provides an analytical framework for considering how cyber means 
15. An example of one such non-governmental organization is the ICRC. The ICRC’s Mandate 
and Mission, INT?L COMM. RED CROSS, https://www.icrc.org/en/mandate-and-mission 
[https://perma.cc/XQM3-32BJ] ?????? ????????????? ??? ??????? ? ???? ????? ??? ??? ?????????????? ????????
organization ensuring humanitarian protection and assistance for victims of armed conflict and other 
situations of violence.  It takes action in response to emergencies and at the same time promotes respect 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????Id.
16. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 6. 
17. See id. 
18. Id. at 460?63.  
19. Id. at 3?5.
20. Id. at 3. 
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and methods could effectively facilitate an expanded use of belligerent reprisals 
for some States under some conditions.  Additionally, this section serves as the 
lens for re-examining the propriety and practicality of breathing life back into 
this controversial enforcement mechanism under IHL.  Lastly, Part VII 
summarizes and concludes the article.  
II. THE HISTORY OF BELLIGERENT REPRISALS IN IHL                                  
Reprisals have been the traditional method of enforcement of IHL since at 
least the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.21  This time period saw a 
number of advances in IHL including the adoption of the first Geneva 
Convention; ???? ???? ???????????s Declaration, which renounced the use of 
exploding bullets projectiles under 400 grams; and the drafting and 
implementation of the so-called Lieber Code22 during the American Civil 
War.23  The 1863 Lieber Code addressed the concept of reprisals throughout its 
157 articles.24 ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????? ??????????????which was used synonymously with the term 
????????????as the sternest feature of war.25  Article 28 of the Code states: 
Art. 28. Retaliation will, therefore, never be resorted to as a 
measure of mere revenge, but only as a means of protective 
retribution, and moreover, cautiously and unavoidably; that is 
to say, retaliation shall only be resorted to after careful inquiry 
into the real occurrence, and the character of the misdeeds that 
may demand retribution.  Unjust or inconsiderate retaliation 
removes the belligerents farther and farther from the mitigating 
rules of regular war, and by rapid steps leads them nearer to the 
internecine wars of savages.26
During the American Civil War reprisals were a lawful method of enforcing 
the laws and customs of war with both sides making abundant use of the 
method.27  The Lieber Code even permitted retaliation against prisoners of war 
21. HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 9, at 514. 
22. SOLIS, supra note 10, at 44?45.  In 1862, the War Department appointed a board of officers, 
???????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Id.  The military officers on the board worked primarily on a revision to the Articles of War. Id.  Francis 
Lieber, a professor at Columbia, wrote the Code that bears his name. Id.  In 1863, President Lincoln 
????????? ????? ????????? ???-????????????? ??? ????????????? ????? ???????????????????????????????? ???
?????????????????????Id.
23. Id. at 43. 
24. See General Orders No. 100: Instructions for the Government Armies of the United States in 
the Field (Apr. 24, 1863) [hereinafter Lieber Code].   
25. Id. art.27.  
26. Id. art.28.  
27. Patryk I. Labuda, The Lieber Code, Retaliation and the Origins of International Criminal 
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?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????28
In only the instance of later capture and execution of deserters joining an enemy 
army did the Lieber Code forbid retaliation.29
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
legal bodies sought to limit the use of reprisals.  The Brussels Conference of 
1874 and the Institute of International Law meeting at Oxford in 1880 were two 
such instances.30 ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????? ?????????? ?????? ????orm in all cases to the laws of humanity and 
morality.?31  However, the Hague Conventions at the turn of the twentieth 
century did not prohibit the use of belligerent reprisals apart from providing 
some rudimentary protections for prisoners of war.32  In fact, during early armed 
conflicts of the twentieth century, air attacks were a legitimate means and 
method of reprisal against a defaulting enemy to bring it back to its senses.33
Commenting on this phenomenon, Air Commodore William Boothby stated: 
The civilian population and the popular press would demand 
retaliatory or reprisal action against the enemy in response to 
air raids that occasioned civilian loss.  Air raids carried out as 
reprisal action could be portrayed by the adverse party as 
simple illegal acts ignoring, of course, the alleged prior 
illegality cited as justifying the reprisal in the first place.34
Reprisals in World War I caused much hardship for the victims of the 
conflict and, in particular, prisoners of war.  As a result, the idea of prohibiting 
all reprisals against prisoners of war gained traction, eventually finding official 
endorsement in special agreements concluded between parties to the conflict 
Law, in 3 HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 299, 304, 306 (Morten Bergsmo 
et al. eds., 2015).  
28. Lieber Code, supra note 24, art.59.  
29. Id. art.48.  This provision specifically states: 
Deserters from the American Army, having entered the service of the enemy, 
suffer death if they fall again into the hands of the United States, whether by 
capture, or being delivered up to the American Army; and if a deserter from the 
enemy, having taken service in the Army of the United States, is captured by the 
enemy, and punished by them with death or otherwise, it is not a breach against 
the law and usages of war, requiring redress or retaliation. 
Id.
30. See Project of an International Declaration Concerning the Laws and Customs of War, 
Brussels, Aug. 27, 1874, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/135 [https://perma.cc/Q5VC-
QGC8]; The Laws of War on Land, Oxford, Sept. 9, 1880, https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/140?OpenDocument [https://perma.cc/M2FJ-AG3G]. 
31. The Laws of War on Land, supra note 30, art.86.  
32. INGRID DETTER, THE LAW OF WAR 301 (2d ed. 2000). 
33. WILLIAM H. BOOTHBY, THE LAW OF TARGETING 512 (2012). 
34. Id. at 512?13. 
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towards the end of the war.35  Following World War I, the 1929 Geneva 
Convention on Prisoners of War began the process of gradually excluding 
groups of persons and ??????????? ???????? from the scope of reprisals,36
including prisoners of war.37  Commenting on this particular category, Michael 
Walzer, in his classic book Just and Unjust Wars, stated, ??????????? ?????
singled out because of the implied contract by surrender, in which they are 
promised life and benevolent quarantine.  Killing them would be a breach of 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????38
Despite these efforts, World War II saw the regular use of reprisals by the 
parties to the conflict.39  There were a number of well-known incidents 
involving reprisals including one involving the Germans and the French 
resistance fighters in 1944.40  After the Normandy invasion, French resistance 
fighters organized into the French Forces on the Interior (FFI) and began 
operating openly and on a larger scale.41  They wore insignia visible at a 
distance, carried their arms openly, and abided by the laws and customs of war, 
thereby qualifying them as lawful combatants.42  However, the Germans did not 
recognize the FFI as lawful combatants.43  Rather, the Germans viewed them 
as criminals and summarily executed a number of FFI fighters upon capture.44
By the late summer of 1944, ?many German soldiers had surrendered to the 
FFI.?45  When the FFI learned the Germans executed eighty FFI fighters and 
planned to execute more, ?the FFI announced that it would carry out eighty 
reprisal executions.?46  The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 
35. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Comment.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=8F88DE5EE
5DEA183C12563CD0042207D [https://perma.cc/P7T2-57TR]. 
36. THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 234 (Dieter Fleck ed., 3d ed. 
2013). 
37. Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Geneva, July 27, 1929, Art. 2, 
https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/ART/305-430003?OpenDocument 
[https://perma.cc/244B-DFX9]. 
38. MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH HISTORICAL 
ILLUSTRATIONS 209 (4th ed. 2006).  
39. DETTER, supra note 32, at 301. 
40. Kenneth Anderson, Reprisal Killings, in CRIMES OF WAR 2.0: WHAT THE PUBLIC SHOULD 
KNOW 358, 358?59 (Roy Gutman, David Rieff & Anthony Dworkin eds., 2007).  
41. Id. at 358. 
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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intervened and sought to postpone the executions pending an agreement 
whereby the Germans would recognize the FFI as lawful combatants.47  But, 
after six days in which the Germans did not respond, the FFI executed eighty 
German prisoners.48  Subsequently, the historical accounts indicate the 
Germans abandoned any plans to execute additional FFI prisoners.49
In addition to the actual use of reprisals by parties in World War II, there 
was also the threatened use of belligerent reprisals.  For example, President 
Franklin Roosevelt threatened the use of retaliatory attacks upon becoming 
aware that Axis forces sought to use poison gas.50  The regular use, or threat of 
use, of belligerent reprisals in World War II thus became an important topic in 
the post-war tribunals.  Commenting about the scope of belligerent reprisals, 
the International Military Tribunal found that:  
The right of reprisals against civilians was restricted by rules 
laid down in the judgments of the Military Tribunal at 
Nuremberg.  The Tribunal emphasised that reprisals must at 
least be limited geographically to one area, mainly as action 
against persons in one area could have little deterrent effect on 
people in other areas.  If there was not such geographical 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the right of reprisals: there had thus to be some connection 
between the reprisals and the civilians against whom action 
was taken.  The Tribunal furthermore ruled out reprisals for 
which certain ethnic, religious or political groups had been 
selected.51
On August 12, 1949, a diplomatic conference in Geneva approved the text 
of four conventions to which more States have ratified than any other 
international agreements in the laws regulating armed conflict: the 1949 
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Andrew D. Mitchell, Does One Illegality Merit Another? The Law of Belligerent Reprisals 
in International Law, 170 MIL. L. REV. 155, 171 (2001).  President Roosevelt specifically stated:  
[T]here have been reports that one or more of the Axis powers were seriously 
contemplating use of poisonous or noxious gases or other inhumane devices of 
warfare. . . . We promise to any perpetrators of such crimes full and swift 
retaliation in kind. . . . Any use of gas by any Axis power, therefore, will 
immediately be followed by the fullest possible retaliation upon munition centers, 
seaports, and other military objectives throughout the whole extent of the territory 
of such Axis country. 
Id. (alteration in original). 
51. DETTER, supra note 32, at 301. 
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Geneva Conventions.52  The Conventions were, in part, born out of the 
unprecedented brutality and violence of World War II.53  As Ambassador 
George H. Aldrich commented:   
The history of development of this branch of international law 
is largely one of reaction to bad experience.  After each major 
war, the survivors negotiate rules for the next war that they 
would, in retrospect, like to have seen in force during the last 
war.  The 1929 and 1949 Geneva Conventions attest to that 
pattern.54
The four Conventions prohibited belligerent reprisals with respect to the 
specific classes of individuals covered by each agreement: wounded, sick, and 
shipwrecked; medical and religious personnel; prisoners of war; civilians in 
occupied territories; as well as certain objects such as medical facilities and 
supplies and private property of civilians in occupied territory.55  Adding to 
52. ADAM ROBERTS & RICHARD GUELFF, DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 195 (3d ed. 
2000).  To provide some background and context, the Geneva Conventions may be traced back to a 
well-to-do Swiss businessman, Henri Dunant, and the Battle of Solferino in 1859. Solferino and the 
International Committee of the Red Cross, INT?L COMM. RED CROSS,
https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/feature/2010/solferino-feature-240609.htm 
[https://perma.cc/KC3E-SDEH] (last visited Jan. 3, 2018).  The Battle of Solferino in Lombardy, not 
far from Milan and Verona, was fought between the forces of Austria and a French-Piedmontese 
alliance. Id.  The battle was one of the bloodiest of the nineteenth century with thousands of dead and 
wounded on both sides. Id.  The military practice of the time was to leave the wounded where they had 
fallen on the battlefield. Id.  Dunant was there and witnessed the carnage and participated in the 
aftermath attempting to provide aid and comfort to survivors. Id.  Dunant could not forget what he saw 
and experienced. Id.  He published in 1862 a small book, A Memory of Solferino. Id.  In the book, 
Dunant vividly and graphically described the battle and the suffering of the wounded and injured 
soldiers. Id.  Additionally, in the book, Dunant called for the creation of relief societies in each country 
that would act as auxiliaries to the army medical services to facilitate the care for all wounded and sick, 
whichever side they were on. Id.  This effort led eventually to the formation of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross. Id?? ??????? ??? ????? ???????????? ??????? ???A Memory of Solferino, he 
proposed that an international principle be created to serve as the basis for these societies. Id??? ????????
idea ultimately led to the Swiss government hosting an official diplomatic conference in August 1864, 
which resulted in the adoption of the first Geneva Convention. Id.  In 1901, Dunant was awarded the 
first-????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ???? ????? ???? ??????????? ?????????? ??? ???? ????????? ?????????????
achievement of the 1??????????????Id.
53. See ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
to Celebrate 60th Anniversary of the Geneva Conventions: The Geneva Conventions of 1949: Origins 
and Current Significance (Dec. 8, 2009),
https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/statement/geneva-conventions-statement-120809.htm 
[https://perma.cc/2QXP-FPQ8]. 
54. SOLIS, supra note 10, at 88.  
55. THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 36, at 234, 334.  
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these prohibitions, the 1954 Hague Convention on the Protection of Cultural 
Property prohibited reprisals against objects protected under the convention.56
The 1977 AP I significantly enlarged the traditional prohibitions of reprisals 
under IHL adding several other categories of prohibited reprisal targets.57  In 
addition to a general prohibition, AP I also specifically prohibits reprisals 
against the civilian population and objects; cultural property and places of 
worship; objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian populations; the 
natural environment; and works or installations containing dangerous forces.58
However, the United States, as well as several other States, objected to these 
additional restrictions on reprisals as being counterproductive.59
?????????????? ???? ??????? ??????? ??????? ??? ???? ???????? ???????????? ???
reprisals removed a significant tool for protecting civilians and war victims on 
all sides of a conflict.60 ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????
reprisal attacks against the civilian population, that is, attacks that would 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
of the ???? ???? ???? ????????? ??? ?????? ??????? ????????????61  Yet, historically, 
reprisals were the major sanction underlying the laws of war and ensured 
reciprocal compliance.62 ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
States, an enemy could deliberately carry out attacks against friendly civilian 
populations, and the United States would be legally forbidden to reply in 
??????63 ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????? on targeting unfriendly 
56. Id. at 434;  see also Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event 
of Armed Conflict, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240, 244?48. 
57. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 6, at 463. 
58. Id. 
59. GEOFFREY S. CORN ET AL., THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: AN OPERATIONAL APPROACH 
????????????????????????????????????????s objections concerning reprisals was one of the reasons it did 
not ratify AP I. See SOLIS, supra note 10, at 128?38; see also Michael J. Matheson, Deputy Legal 
????????? ???? ??????????????? ????????? American Red Cross-Washington College of Law Conference 
on International Humanitarian Law (Jan. 22, 1987), in 2 AM. U. J. INT?L L. & POL?Y 419, 426 (1987). 
60. OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, U.S. DEP?T OF DEF., DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE LAW OF 
WAR MANUAL § 18.18.3.4, at 1088?89 (2016) [hereinafter LAW OF WAR MANUAL]. 
61. Id. § 18.18.3.4, at 1089 n.221 (quoting ?????? ??????? ???????????????? ???????? ???? ?????
of State, Remarks at American Red Cross-Washington College of Law Conference on International 
Humanitarian Law (Jan. 22, 1987), in 2 AM. U. J. INT?L L. & POL?Y 460, 469 (1987)). 
62. See Watts, supra note 12, at 382. 
63. LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 60, § 18.18.3.4, at 1089 n.221 (quoting Sofaer, supra
note 61, at 469). 
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civilian populations.64  Today, the United States continues to hold, as an option, 
the use of reprisals in limited circumstances.65
III. BELLIGERENT REPRISALS TODAY IN IHL 
As is evident from the above, the historical development of reprisals under 
IHL established a gradual trend to outlaw the practice.66  There are, however, 
several important considerations with respect to reprisals under the present IHL 
framework.  First, as a threshold matter, to the degree that a reprisal would be 
lawful today, they are subject to stringent controls.67  Second, the concept of 
belligerent reprisals exists in the context of international armed conflicts and 
not in non-international armed conflicts.68  And third, under customary IHL, 
there are six general conditions precedent to lawfully employing belligerent 
reprisals.69
The first condition relates to the purpose of reprisals.70  As mentioned 
previously, the use of reprisals is only in reaction to a prior serious violation of 
IHL and done for the purpose of inducing the enemy to comply with IHL.71  In 
many respects, this is the sine qua non of reprisals, i.e., to induce a law-breaking 
State to abide by IHL in the future.72  Of course, in practice, determining motive 
for particular actions may be problematic.  That is, it may be very difficult to 
discern whether there is a legitimate purpose for an action, i.e., inducing an 
adversary to comply with the law, or whether an act is actually retaliation, 
retribution, or revenge.73  Additionally, because of the underlying purpose of 
belligerent reprisals, anticipatory or counter reprisals are impermissible.74
The second condition is that the employment of belligerent reprisals is a 
matter of last resort, and there must be no other lawful measures available to 
induce the enemy to respect and comply with IHL.75  Before using reprisals, 
64. Id. (quoting Sofaer, supra note 61, at 469).  
65. See CORN ET AL., supra note 59, at 227. 
66. HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 9, at 513?14. 
67. Id. at 513.  
68. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 6, at 464.  The ICRC, in Rule 148 of its Customary 
International Law Study takes the position that parties to non-international armed conflicts do not have 
the right to resort to belligerent reprisals. See HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 9, at 526. 
69. HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 9, at 515?18; see also LAW OF WAR MANUAL,
supra note 60, § 18.18.2.5, at 1086. 
70. HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 9, at 515. 
71. Id.   
72. Id. at 515?16.  
73. BEST, supra note 11, at 167. 
74. HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 9, at 515. 
75. Id. at 516.  
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????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
certain means.76  For example, actions such as ?protests and demands, retorsion, 
or reasonable notice of the threat to use reprisals? are necessary before resorting 
to belligerent reprisals.77  Notably, both international and domestic courts 
require meeting this condition prior to utilizing reprisals.78   
The third condition is proportionality.79  Proportionality has multiple 
meanings in international law.  Generally, within the context of customary IHL, 
proportionality is understood to mean that an attack is prohibited if the 
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or 
a combination thereof, is ?excessive in relation to the concrete and direct 
military advantage anticipated.?80  By contrast, in the context of belligerent 
reprisals, most State practices illustrate that the acts taken in reprisal be 
proportionate to the original violation, free from the balancing approach under 
the prevalent proportionality notion.81
In practice, proportionality may be hard to gauge in nature and scope, 
although it does not mean equivalence.  Rather, it should be construed to mean 
the response should not be excessive.82  Additionally, it is important to note that 
the proportionality requirement does not mean that the belligerent reprisal 
needs to be in kind.83  For example, if State A bombs civilian objects in State 
B, State B is not limited to only bombing civilian objects in State A.  In fact, 
there are many scenarios where there is not a direct counterpart to the original 
violation or the victim State may simply lack the technical expertise to respond 
in the same fashion.84
The fourth condition is somewhat straightforward and self-explanatory.  
Because reprisals are significant military and political acts that require careful 
and complex judgments, the law withholds authority to exact reprisals to the 
highest levels of government within a State.85  As noted by one legal 
commentator about this unusual, but important condition:  
Because of the extremely complex legal and political 
assessment which must precede any reprisal, it is necessary 
76. YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL 
ARMED CONFLICT 221 (2004).  
77. LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 60, § 18.18.2.2, at 1085. 
78. HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 9, at 516. 
79. Id. at 517.   
80. LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 60, § 2.4.1.2, at 61. 
81. HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 9, at 518. 
82. DINSTEIN, supra note 76, at 221. 
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 9, at 518. 
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that the political leadership of a belligerent state decide on any 
possible use of reprisals.  The exact legal nature of the adverse 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
even more importantly, a decision to use reprisals requires a 
genuine assessment of the political risks as well as the 
immediate dangers connected with the use of a reprisal.86
The fifth condition is intuitive and consistent with the overarching purpose 
of reprisals.  Under this requirement, reprisal actions must immediately cease 
as soon as the enemy complies with IHL.87  This condition is consistent with 
and highlights the nature of reprisals as a deterrent measure.  Finally, the sixth 
condition prior to using reprisals is that in order to fulfil their purpose, dissuade 
an adversary from further unlawful conduct, and to promote adherence to IHL, 
States must announce the action and make it public.88
Beyond these six, strictly legal considerations, there are also several 
practical consequences before resorting to the use of belligerent reprisals.  First, 
resorting to belligerent reprisals may ultimately divert valuable and scarce 
military resources.89  Second, since belligerent reprisals are, by definition, 
violations of international norms, other States may not only disagree with the 
decision to use them, but also view their use as a violations of IHL and subject 
to sanction.90  Third, it is very possible the use of reprisals may strengthen an 
??????????????????????????????????????91  Fourth, many observers view reprisals 
??? ?? ?????? ??? ???? ????????? ???????? ??? ?? ???????? ?????? ??? ???????-reprisals.92
Finally, like other serious violations of IHL, the use of belligerent reprisals may 
exacerbate tensions between the parties to the conflict making it more difficult 
for them to end the armed conflict and return to a peaceful state.93  Given the 
legal framework as outlined above, coupled with a number of compelling 
practical considerations, belligerent reprisals are seemingly a waning IHL 
enforcement mechanism.  Yet, the New Age of Cyber is challenging many 
seemingly settled areas of international law and therefore it is worth discussing 
the validity of belligerent reprisals during cyber operations. 
86. THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 36, at 228. 
87. HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 9, at 518. 
88. LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 60, § 18.18.2.5, at 1086. 
89. Id. § 18.18.4, at 1090.  
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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IV. CYBER OPERATIONS AND BELLIGERENT REPRISALS: THE LEX LATA
As a starting point, when thinking about the lex lata, it is important to 
reiterate that the applicable IHL treaties were drafted before cyberspace and 
operations were a reality.94  Likewise, there are many challenges associated 
with the emergence of customary IHL cyber-related norms with the most 
notable being the highly classified nature of cyber activities by States.95
However, it is also important to note, as discussed above, it is widely accepted 
that IHL applies to cyber operations in the context of an armed conflict.96  With 
that said, the Tallinn Manual 2.0 Rules and Commentary provide a valuable 
resource and assist in identifying issues, gaps, and ambiguities in the law.  But, 
when thinking about the lex lata, it is always important to be mindful of whether 
application of traditional rules of IHL make sense when applied in the cyber 
context.   
This acknowledgment includes the possible use of belligerent reprisals with 
Rule 108 of Tallinn Manual 2.0, which provides basic parameters for use during 
cyber operations in an international armed conflict.  The Rule notes that 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????prisoners of war; interned 
civilians, civilians in occupied territory or otherwise in the hands of an adverse 
party to the conflict, and their property; those hors de combat; and medical and 
?????????? ??????????? ???????????? ?????????? ???? ???????????97 In other 
??????????????? ?????? ?????????????? ???? ????? ???? ????????? ???? ?????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????98
The Commentary to Rule 108 provides granularity into the expert??
conclusions concerning belligerent reprisals.  The experts state, unequivocally, 
that cyber reprisals are prohibited against the wounded, sick, or shipwrecked; 
medical personnel, units, establishments, or transports; chaplains; prisoners of 
war, or interned civilians and civilians in the hands of an adverse party who are 
protected by the Fourth Geneva Convention, or their property.99  In effect, these 
prohibitions are customary international law that binds all States.  However, the 
94. DINNISS, supra note 8, at 239, 241.  
95. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 6, at 377. 
96. Id. at 3.  When one thinks of the use of cyber in the context of an armed conflict, it involves 
not only the employment of cyber capabilities to objectives in and through cyberspace, but also 
involves requirements such as weapons reviews to ensure that cyber means of warfare that are acquired 
or used complies with the law of armed conflict. Id. at 375; Michael N. Schmitt & Liis Vihul, The
Emergence of International Legal Norms for Cyberconflict, in BINARY BULLETS: THE ETHICS OF 
CYBERWARFARE 34, 49 (Fritz Allhoff, Adam Henschke & Bradley Jay Strauser eds., 2016).  
97. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 6, at 460.  
98. Id.  
99. Id. at 461.   
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experts disagreed as to whether customary international law protected cultural 
property.100
Further outlining the proper use of belligerent reprisals in the cyber context, 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????Tallinn 
2.0.  The Rule, rooted in seven different provisions found in AP I, states: 
Additional Protocol I prohibits States Parties from making the 
civilian population, individual civilians, civilian objects, 
cultural property and places of worship, objects indispensable 
to the survival of the civilian population, the natural 
environment, and dams, dykes, and nuclear electrical 
generating stations the object of a cyber-attack by the way of 
reprisal.101
The commentary to Rule 109 expands on the general prohibition of cyber 
reprisals against the aforementioned categories by those States that are parties 
to AP I and engaged in an international armed conflict.102  But, the commentary 
suggests the prohibition is conditional for certain States that adopted 
understandings during the ratification of AP I.103 And, despite certain 
international tribunals holding reprisals against civilians a violation of 
?????????? ?????????????? ????? ????? ????????? ???? ???? ??? ????????lise?? ????? ??
customary rule due to contrary practice.104  Nevertheless, in substance, the 
Tallinn Manual 2.0 experts found that AP I dramatically reduces the use of 
reprisals in cyber operations by limiting use to only against enemy armed 
forces, their facilities, and equipment.105
Tallinn Manual 2.0??? ????? ???, Rule 109, and associated commentary 
provide an excellent summary of the current law concerning belligerent 
reprisals in the cyber context.  Clearly, the Tallinn Manual 2.0 agrees that 
belligerent reprisals have limited use in the contemporary environment as an 
IHL enforcement mechanism.  However, a comparison between belligerent 
reprisals and the concept of countermeasures under international law may 
indicate it is time to revisit this determination in the New Age of Cyber.  It is 
important to note that such an intellectual and academic thought experiment, 
i.e., comparing countermeasures and belligerent reprisals, should not be taken 
to conflate or confuse these two distinct enforcement mechanisms under 
international law.  They are very different.  The common ground between the 
100. Id. at 463.  
101. Id.
102. Id. at 463?64. 
103. Id.
104. Id. at 464. 
105. CORN ET AL., supra note 59, at 227.  See generally KOLB & HYDE, supra note 4, at 195.  
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two is in their underlying purpose and that alone warrants the comparison 
below. 
V. COUNTERMEASURES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
In the first half of the twentieth century, so-called countermeasures were 
referred to as ?peacetime reprisals.?106  Although belligerent reprisals and 
countermeasures apply under different circumstances, their purpose is 
fundamentally the same: to force a State that violates international law to 
discontinue illegal activity.107  In this respect, countermeasures provide a good 
point of comparison with belligerent reprisals.  
As a threshold matter, it is important to note that States are responsible for 
their internationally wrongful acts under the law of State responsibility.108
??????????????????????????????? ??? ??????????? Articles of State Responsibility 
for Internationally Wrongful Acts109 provides as follows: 
Article 2 
Elements of an internationally wrongful act of a State 
There is an internationally wrongful act of a State when 
conduct consisting of an action or omission: 
(a) is attributable to the State under international law; and 
(b) constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the 
State.110
106. Michael N. Schmitt, Cyber Activities and the Law of Countermeasures, in PEACETIME
REGIME FOR STATE ACTIVITIES IN CYBERSPACE: INTERNATIONAL LAW, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
AND DIPLOMACY 659, 662 (Katharina Ziolkowski ed., 2013).  The term peacetime is no longer used.  
107. Id. at 661?62. 
108. Id. at 661. 
109. ?????? ??? ??????? ??????????? ????????????????-Third Session, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, (2001), 
http://www.un.org/law/ilc/ [https://perma.cc/9838-MCGV] [hereinafter Articles on State 
Responsibility].  Beginning in 1956, the Articles of State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts were drafted over decades by the International Law Commission.  The 59 Articles  are divided 
into four parts: Part One (The Internationally Wrongful Act of the State, articles 1?27); Part Two 
(Content of the International Responsibility of a State, articles 28?41); Part Three (The Implementation 
of the International Responsibility of a State, articles 42?54); and Part Four (articles 55?59) contains 
the final five General Provisions of the text.  Although the Articles are not binding, they are 
authoritative because the International Law Commission developed them over decades under the 
leadership of multiple special rapporteurs. Schmitt, supra note 106, at 661.  
110. James Crawford, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION?S ARTICLES ON STATE 
RESPONSIBILITY: INTRODUCTION, TEXT AND COMMENTARIES 81 (2002).  As noted in the commentary 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????see Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 109, at 34. 
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The breach of an international obligation may consist of a violation of a 
treaty, customary international law, or of general principles of law.111  For 
example, internationally wrongful acts may include a cyber operation that 
violates the sovereignty of another State or the principle of non-intervention 
among other things. 112  A well-known recent example of an international 
wrongful act involved the Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential 
election.113 ?????????? ??? ?????????? ???????? ????????? ?????????? ?????????
attempt to influence the outcome of the election by its release of emails through 
WikiLeaks probably violates the international law barring intervention in a 
??????????????????????????114  Another example may be a State that conducts cyber 
operations against a coastal State from a ship located in the territorial waters of 
the injured State.  These actions would breach international law proscribing 
innocent passage found in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea.115
One possible consequence for a state that chooses to commit an 
international wrongful act is entitling a targeted state to resort to 
countermeasures.116 ????????????????? ???? ???????? ??? ??? ???????? ?????? ?????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
legal obligations) in order to persuade the latter to return to a state of 
????????????117  Countermeasures are therefore different than either a retorsion 
or a plea of necessity.  Retorsions are actions taken by a State that are best 
111. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 109, at 35.  
112. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 6, at 312?13. 
113. See Russian Hacking and Influence in the U.S. Election, N.Y. TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/news-event/russian-election-hacking [https://perma.cc/3FFS-PADV] (last 
visited Apr. 3, 2018). 
114. Ellen Nakashima, Russia’s Apparent Meddling in U.S. Election is Not an Act of War, Cyber 
Expert Says, WASH. POST (Feb. 7, 2017), 
www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2017/02/07/russias-apparent-meddling-in-u-s-
election-is-not-an-act-of-war-cyber-expert-says/?utm_term=.0e23dfb985de [https://perma.cc/SU9Q-
MYGM]. 
115. Schmitt, supra note 106, at 664?65. 
116. See ?????????????????????????????? ????????????????-Fifth Session, U.N. Doc. A/58/10, at 
75 (2003), http://www.un.org/law/ilc/ [https://perma.cc/57YV-NKTX] [hereinafter Articles on State 
??????????????? ???? ??????????????????? ??? ??? ???? ??? ???????? ???? ??? ???????????????? ??? ??????????????
obligation towards another State is precluded if and to the extent that the act constitutes a 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
117. Michael Schmitt, International Law and Cyber Attacks: Sony v. North Korea, JUST 
SECURITY (Dec. 17, 2014), http://justsecurity.org/18460/international-humanitarian-law-cyber-
attacks-sony-v-north-korea/ [https://perma.cc/CN2H-5JRZ]; see also TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? State [in response to 
internationally wrongful acts] directed against a responsible State that would violate an obligation 
??????????????????????????????????????
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described as unfriendly, but not inconsistent with an international obligation of 
a State.118  An example includes limitations upon normal diplomatic relations 
or other contacts, embargos of various kinds, or withdrawal of voluntary aid 
programs.119  A plea of necessity, on the other hand, denotes exceptional cases 
where a State, faced with grave and imminent peril to an essential interest, takes 
measures counter to its international obligations to safeguard those particular 
interests.120  In the cyber context, an example of the circumstances leading to a 
plea of necessity may involve a cy???? ?????????? ???????? ?? ???????? ?????????
infrastructure.121  In contrast to either a retorsion or a plea of necessity, a 
??????????????? ??????? ??? ?????? ??????????? ??? ??????? . . . to use acts 
traditionally prohibited under international law to force the offending state to 
?????????????????????????????????????122
In describing countermeasures in a cyber context, Professor William Banks 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????cyber in nature or 
not, below the use of force threshold designed to prevent or mitigate a 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????123  In this 
regard, countermeasures are similar to belligerent reprisals in that they allow a 
State to act unlawfully in order to force international legal compliance.124  Of 
course there are differences between the two?countermeasures only apply 
below the use of force threshold, are limited in severity,125 and must not involve 
the threat or use of force126?whereas belligerent reprisals only apply during an 
international armed conflict and would otherwise violate IHL but for a prior 
illegal act.127  Nevertheless, despite these differences, countermeasures provide 
118. Schmitt, supra note 117.  
119. Id.  
120. DINNISS, supra note 8, at 102.   
121. Schmitt, supra note 106, at 663. 
122. Daniel Garrie & Shane R. Reeves, So You’re Telling Me There’s a Chance: How the 
Articles on State Responsibility Could Empower Corporate Responses to State-Sponsored Cyber 
Attacks, HARV. NAT?L SECURITY J. ONLINE FEATURES 5 (2015), http://harvardnsj.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/01/Garrie-and-Reeves-Non-State-Actor-and-Self-Defense.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/SY6X-W7PR]. 
123. William Banks, State Responsibility and Attribution of Cyber Intrusions After Tallinn 2.0, 
95 TEX. L. REV. 1487, 1501 (2017). 
124. Schmitt, supra note 106, at 662.  As noted by Professor Schmitt, the idea of a reprisal was 
also thought of in a jus ad bellum ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
than that of countermeasures in that it included both non-forceful and forceful actions.  Today, forceful 
reprisals have been sub????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????Id.
125. Articles on State Responsibility II, supra note 116, at 129. 
126. Id. at 131.  See generally TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 6, at 38.  
127. Schmitt, supra note 106, at 662. 
2018] REVISITING BELLIGERENT REPRISALS IN THE AGE OF CYBER? 99 
a valuable lens by which to view belligerent reprisals in the context of cyber 
operations.  Accordingly, there are four features of countermeasures worth 
highlighting: (1) the purpose of countermeasures; (2) restrictions or limitations 
on their use; (3) proportionality; and (4) attribution standards. 
The purpose of a countermeasure is to return a situation to a condition of 
lawfulness128 by inducing a State, who is responsible for internationally 
wrongful acts, to comply with its obligations and where appropriate make 
assurances or guarantees and reparations.  Rule 21 of Tallinn Manual 2.0
further speaks to the purpose of countermeasures in the context of cyber.  It 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
taken to induce a responsible State to comply with the legal obligations it owes 
an ???????? ???????129  Furthermore, by definition, countermeasures are a 
reactive, remedial, self-help measure necessitated by a lack of a compulsory 
dispute resolution mechanism, and are a product of a decentralized system by 
which an aggrieved State may seek to vindicate its rights and restore a proper 
legal relationship with the responsible State.130
It is important to note, however, that countermeasures are not intended as 
punishment.131  Yet, like other forms of self-help, countermeasures are subject 
to abuse, especially between States of unequal power.132  And, similar to 
belligerent reprisals, it may be difficult to distinguish the precise motive for 
pursuing the countermeasure.  In other words, a pertinent question is whether 
countermeasures exacted against a State are being done to induce the State, who 
is responsible for internationally wrongful acts, to comply, or is it being done 
in retaliation, retribution, or revenge?  In answering this question, if the 
countermeasure will only exacerbate a situation, it is likely a fair indication the 
motive may be rooted more in retaliation.133
The second inquiry involves restrictions on the use of countermeasures.  
The most significant restriction stems from the use of force as proscribed by 
128. Id. at 674. 
129. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 6, at 116.  Speaking to the underlying mind set of 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????kness of the other Party.  They 
should be used with a spirit of great moderation and be accompanied by a genuine effort at resolving 
??????????????Case Concerning the Air Service Agreement of 27 March 1946 Between the United States 
of America and France, 18 U.N. REP. INT?L ARBITRAL AWARDS 417, 445.  One particular risk in the 
context of cyber is the speed at which cyber operations may unfold, both intentionally wrongful acts 
and countermeasures, may detract from careful consideration of intent and consequences.   
130. Schmitt, supra note 106, at 662; DINNISS, supra note 8, at 281. 
131. Schmitt, supra note 106, at 674. 
132. Id.
133. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 6, at 117. 
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Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter.134  Articles 49 and 50 of the Articles 
of State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts further define the 
limits of the legal boundaries on the use of countermeasures.135  Under Article 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
to the responsible State?s period of non-performance of its international 
obligations.136  Additionally, as far as possible, countermeasures must be taken 
in such a way to permit the resumption of performance of the obligation in 
question.137  Article 50 expands on the foregoing by specifying a number of 
international obligations the performance of which may not be impaired by 
countermeasures.138  Drawing from Article 50, Tallinn Manual 2.0, Rule 22 
????????? ????? ???????????????????? ???????? ?????? ??? ??????? ??? ????? ???? ????
include actions that affect fundamental human rights, amount to prohibited 
belligerent reprisals, or violate peremptory norm. A State taking 
countermeasures must fulfil its obligations with respect to diplomatic and 
????????????????????????139
The third inquiry when considering the use of countermeasures involves the 
notion of proportionality.140  Article 51 of the Articles of State Responsibility
????????? ????? ?????????????????s must be commensurate with the injury141
suffered, taking into account the gravity of the internationally wrongful act and 
???? ??????? ??? ??????????142 ????? ????? ???? ?????????? ??? ?????????????????
134. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4.  This provision also reflects customary international law.  As noted 
by Professor Schmitt, the dilemma lies in determining when a cyber operation qualifies as a use of 
force thereby making it impermissible as a countermeasure. See Schmitt, supra note 106, at 678. 
135. Articles on State Responsibility II, supra note 116, at 129?34.  
136. Id. at 129. 
137. Id. 
138. Id. at 131. 
139. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 6, at 122?23. 
140. It is important to note that proportionality with respect to countermeasures is separate and 
distinct from the concept of proportionality in jus ad bellum or IHL.  With respect to jus ad bellum, the 
concept of proportionality considers the degree of force necessary for a State to defend itself against 
an armed attack.  In that context, proportionality serves to identify the circumstances in which the 
unilateral use of force is permissible under international law.  Additionally, it also serves to determine 
the intensity and the magnitude of military operations.  In the context of IHL, proportionality means 
essentially whether an attack shall be cancelled or suspended if the attack may be expected to cause 
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof. 
See Protocol I, supra note 13, art. 51, at 37, art. 57, at 41?42. 
141. Articles of State Responsibility II, supra ?????????????????????????????????????????????????
international legal obligation.  It should not be understood to require damage. See TALLINN MANUAL
2.0, supra note 6, at 127.   
142. Articles of State Responsibility II, supra note 116, at 134; DINNISS, supra note 8, at 103?
04.  The principle of proportionality is a deeply rooted requirement for countermeasures and is widely 
recognized in State practice, doctrine and international jurisprudence.  For example, in the Naulilaa
??????????????????????????????,??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
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proportionality is also an essential limitation on the injured State in terms of the 
employment of specific countermeasures and the level of their intensity.143  A 
countermeasure that is disproportionate amounts to an impermissible 
punishment or retaliation, and is contrary to the object and purpose of 
countermeasures.144  A proportionality analysis provides a check on the 
potentially escalating effect of countermeasures and is a control on the exercise 
of ?decentralized power conferred on States to react individually to 
international wrongful acts.?145 However, it is important to note that 
proportionality does not mean or imply reciprocity.146  In fact, it is entirely 
lawful to use non-cyber countermeasures in responses to an internationally 
wrongful act involving cyber operations.147
In the context of cyber, it is feasible to narrowly tailor the intensity, 
duration, and effects of the operation.  For example, a cyber operation aimed at 
incapacitating infrastructure without destroying it may be particularly useful in 
meeting the limitations on countermeasures, including proportionality.148
Noting the challenges of assessing proportionality in the context of 
countermeasures, Tallinn Manual 2.0 states, in part: 
The interconnected and interdependent nature of cyber systems 
can render it difficult to determine accurately the consequences 
likely to result from cyber countermeasures.  States must 
therefore exercise considerable care when assessing whether 
their countermeasures will be proportionate.  Conducting a full 
assessment may require, for instance, mapping the targeted 
system or reviewing relevant intelligence.  Whether the 
assessment is adequate depends on the foreseeability of 
potential consequences and the feasibility of means that can be 
used to conduct it.149
The final issue with respect to countermeasures concerns attribution.  The 
issue of attribution includes more than technically determining the source of the 
require that the reprisal be approximately measured by the offense, one should certainly consider as 
excessive, and thus illegal, reprisals out of all proportion with the act which motiv????????????Naulilaa 
Incident Arbitration, Portuguese-German Arbitral Tribunal, 1928, reprinted and translated in
WILLIAM W. BISHOP, JR., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 903, 904 (3d ed. 1971). 
143. DINNISS, supra note 8, at 104. 
144. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 6, at 127.   
145. JAMES CRAWFORD, STATE RESPONSIBILITY: THE GENERAL PART 698 (James Crawford & 
John S. Bell eds., 2013). 
146. See DINNISS, supra note 8, at 104. 
147. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 6, at 128. 
148. MARCO ROSCINI, CYBER OPERATIONS AND THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
106 (2014). 
149. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 6, at 128. 
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attack.  It also includes policy and legal issues.  The difficulties in attributing 
cyber-attacks and determining the identity of the perpetrators causes a 
perception that States can operate with virtual impunity in the cyber realm.150
The various tools, tactics, and techniques available to conceal cyber activities 
compounds the challenges to attribute attacks to States, non-State actors, or 
individuals.151  For example, a responsible State may gain ?control of another 
??????????????????????????????????????????? ?????harmful? attacks against a third 
State.152  This situation illustrates the technical complexities that exist in the 
cyber domain.  While future technological innovations may mitigate the 
attribution obstacle, ?as with any forensic investigation, information gathering?
in cyberspace is likely to remain technically challenging, time consuming, and 
resource intensive.153
While ascertaining the source of a cyber-attack remains problematic, some 
influential thought leaders have challenged the paradigmatic thinking that 
discovering the point of attack and those individuals responsible is necessary 
for the purpose of attribution.154  Proponents of this concept disagree that once 
the technical forensics of the attack is established only then can attribution hope 
to determine the person or organization responsible for it.155  Instead, they 
conceptualize the problem of attribution as one to consider in the light of this 
question: What do national policy leaders actually need to know about the cyber 
operation?156  In answering this question, national leaders should simply know 
who is ultimately responsible for the attack rather than who actually committed 
the acts. 
An example of this distinction between determining responsibility versus 
identifying the actual perpetrators occurred in 1999 when NATO inadvertently 
bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade during the armed conflict in 
Kosovo.157  In the aftermath of the tragedy, scores of people gathered in Beijing 
near the U.S. Embassy, including many students bused in for the protests.158
150. Michael N. Schmitt & Liis Vihul, Proxy Wars in Cyberspace: The Evolving International 
Law of Attribution, FLETCHER SECURITY REV., Spring 2014, at 53, 54 (2014). 
151. Schmitt, supra note 106, at 685. 
152. Id.
153. Louise Arimatsu, Classifying Cyber Warfare, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CYBERSPACE 326, 333 (Nicholas Tsagourias & Russell Buchan eds., 
2015). 
154. Jason Healy, The Spectrum of National Responsibility for Cyberattacks, BROWN J. WORLD 
AFF., Fall/Winter 2011, at 57, 57 (2011).   
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 58. 
158. Id.
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Despite protesters pummeling the U.S. Embassy with bricks and rocks,159 U.S. 
authorities did not seek to identify the individual stone throwers ?because the 
exact attribution was not an important input for decision makers.?160  The 
United States knew that the Chinese were responsible for attacks regardless of 
who threw the individual rocks.161  Even though knowing who actually threw 
the rocks would provide many data points, that information would not be 
particularly helpful to deciding how to respond to the incident.162  Similarly, 
with cyber-attacks, it is often not necessarily probative who actually initiated 
the attack at the lowest technical level.163  Instead, the most important 
determination is who is overall responsible.  In sum, reconceptualizing the 
concept of attribution may serve to provide decision-makers with flexibility to 
respond in the complex domain of cyber.164
Countermeasures have become an important tool, even if not used, for 
States to force compliance with international law in cyber space below the use 
of force threshold.165  Taking the foregoing background into consideration, 
countermeasures are, in many respects, the other side of the belligerent reprisal 
coin.  It is therefore worth asking whether belligerent reprisals may serve an 
equally useful purpose as countermeasures when addressing cyber operations 
in the international armed conflict context.  
159. Chinese in Belgrade, Beijing Protest NATO Embassy Bombing, CNN (May 9, 1999, 9:44 
PM), http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/asiapcf/9905/09/china.protest.03/ [https://perma.cc/E6EG-
QQZF]. 
160. Healy, supra note 154, at 58. 
161. Id. 
162. Id.
163. Id. at 57.   
164. Attribution also presents challenging legal and factual issues.  For example, what are the 
evidentiary considerations when using countermeasures?  The Commentary to the Articles on State 
Responsibility suggest the standard for factual attribution is identification with responsible certainty, 
see Schmitt, supra note 106, at 685, and, importantly, only States may use countermeasures. TALLINN 
MANUAL 2.0, supra note 6, at 130.  This restriction thus precludes private firms, like Sony for instance, 
??????????????????????-??????????????????????????????North Korea after a cyber-attack in 2014. See 
generally David E. Sanger, David D. Kirkpatrick & Nicole Perlroth, The World Once Laughed at North 
Korean Cyberpower. No More., N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/15/world/asia/north-korea-hacking-cyber-sony.html 
[https://perma.cc/985U-TXV8]. But see generally Garrie & Reeves, supra note 122, at 13 (discussing 
a possible way for a corporation to use countermeasures). 
165. See, e.g., Nakashima, supra note 114 (noting that the United States most likely has grounds 
to use countermeasures against Russia for the 2016 election hacking actions) (quoting Professor 
Michael Schmitt). 
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VI. BELLIGERENT REPRISALS AND CYBER: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, one of the leading international lawyers of the 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
vanishing point of law, the law of war is, perhaps even more conspicuously, at 
???? ?????????? ?????? ??? ?????????????? ?????166 ??? ????? ??????? ??????????????
insightful remarks are not surprising in that IHL is attempting to regulate the 
worst of human conditions?war.  International Humanitarian Law seeks to 
introduce moderation and restraint into a pursuit defined by violence and death, 
unbridled passion and hatred, as well as confusion and unpredictability.  At its 
best, IHL is never more than imperfectly observed, and at its worst, very poorly 
observed.167  Commenting on the effectiveness of the jus in bello, distinguished 
British historian Geoffrey Best stated, ?????? ??????? ??????s not so much 
complain that the law of war does not work well, as marvel that it works at 
?????168  Unquestionably, Best is absolutely correct in his assessment.  Yet, 
beyond the substance and circumstances of what IHL attempts to regulate, there 
is another factor that places international law generally, and IHL specifically, 
????????????????????????????????anemic enforcement mechanisms.  
The challenges in enforcing and implementing norms are a significant 
reason why international law faces enduring criticism.  Arguably, meaningful 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
commands of a sovereign backed by sanctions as articulated by legal positivists 
from Hobbes to Austin.169  Furthermore, critics have long contended the 
intractable problem of meaningful enforcement and sanctions in international 
law not only undermines the effectiveness and credibility of the international 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
it cannot be imposed.170  Even then, one has to be careful not to overstate the 
problem and place international law in the proper context: 
The international situation cannot be equated to the situation 
within states.  There is not a powerful international body that 
has authority over the subjects of the law; the international 
community does not have an international police force and a 
166. BEST, supra note 11, at 12. 
167. Id. at 11.  
168. Id. at 12. 
169. Jack Goldsmith & Daryl Levinson, Law for States: International Law, Constitutional Law, 
Public Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1791, 1822 (2009). 
170. Elena Katselli Proukaki, The Problem of Enforcement in International Law: 
Countermeasures, the Non-Injured State and the Idea of International Community, INT?L L. OBSERVER 
(May 18, 2010, 11:23 AM), http://www.internationallawobserver.eu/2010/05/18/the-problem-of-
enforcement-in-international-law-countermeasures-the-non-injured-state-and-the-idea-of-
international-community [https://perma.cc/S9UZ-6EW6]. 
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judiciary with compulsory jurisdiction; thus, coercive power 
exercised by the international community cannot be relied 
upon to enforce international obligations.  The sovereignty and 
equality of states precludes the operation of such mechanisms, 
and ensures that the execution of the law is precarious and, 
sometimes, irregular.171
Although difficulties exist in enforcing IHL, there are some mechanisms 
for enforcement including protecting powers,172 fact finding commissions,173
penal sanctions,174 and reparations.175  But, challenges still remain.  The absence 
of a hierarchical system or institution capable of enforcement, implementation, 
and accountabil???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
undergoing meaningful change in the foreseeable future.  So, how should the 
international community respond when confronted with the realities of 
international law?  Do advances in technology provide an opportunity to better 
promote lawfulness on the modern battlefield?  In the context of cyber and the 
emergence of new capabilities, revisiting belligerent reprisals provides a means 
to overcome the obvious challenges underlying the enforcement of IHL. 
One way to conceptualize or consider the issue of belligerent reprisals is to 
think of them as three points on a left-to-right continuum.  At the far left end of 
the continuum, the first category, are belligerent reprisals that should never 
171. KOLB & HYDE, supra note 4, at 283. 
172. ???????????????????????????????????????????????????-party State designated as a party to the 
conflict and accepted by the enemy party.  This State has agreed to carry out the functions assigned to 
a protecting Power under IHL.  These functions include monitoring and ensure compliance with the 
law.  In the absence of an agreement, the ICRC or any other impartial humanitarian organization may 
designate a protecting power substitute.  Notably, the use of this system is rare in recent years. See
Protecting Powers: How Does the Law Protect in War?, INT?L COMM. RED CROSS,
https://casebook.icrc.org/glossary/protecting-powers [https://perma.cc/CZ47-2G5G] (last visited Jan. 
26, 2018). 
173. Article 90 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I provides for the establishment of an 
International Fact-Finding Commission.  Established in 1991, it is a permanent body of 15 independent 
???????????????????????????????????????????? ??? ????????????????ose is to contribute to implementation 
of and ensure respect for IHL in armed conflicts. Thilo Marauhn, The International Humanitarian Fact 
Finding Commission—Dedicated to Facilitating Respect for International Humanitarian Law, INT?L
HUMANITARIAN FACT-FINDING COMM?N, www.ihffc.org/index.asp?Language=EN&page=home 
[https://perma.cc/8YXN-9DHV] (last visited Jan. 26, 2018). 
174. International Humanitarian Law is enforceable in both domestic courts and international 
tribunals.  Over the last three decades there has been significant efforts internationally to prosecute war 
crimes in ad hoc tribunals like the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda as well as the International Criminal Court. 
175. HUMA HAIDER, GSDRC, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORKS FOR HUMANITARIAN 
ACTION: TOPIC GUIDE 49 (2013), http://www.gsdrc.org/topic-guides/international-legal-frameworks-
for-humanitarian-action/challenges/compliance-with-and-enforcement-of-ihl/ 
[https://perma.cc/FF3Z-XKFX]. 
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occur regardless of the motive, means, or method.  For example, belligerent 
reprisals against persons under the control of a party to the conflict should never 
be the target of a reprisal.  As a representative list, this would include the 
following category of individuals: ?prisoners of war; interned civilians, 
civilians in occupied territory or otherwise in the hands of an adverse party to 
the conflict, and their property; those hors de combat; and medical and religious 
personnel, facilities, vehicles, and equipment.?176
This first category also contains certain objects immune as targets of 
reprisals, including medical buildings, vessels, or equipment; works or 
installations containing dangerous forces; objects indispensable to the survival 
of the civilian population; and cultural property and places of worship.177
Furthermore, the belligerent reprisals continuum precludes the use of chemical 
or biological weapons.178  Certain cyber operations that would fit into the above 
category include opening the flood gates of a dam causing the release of a body 
of water capable of widespread destruction; or, using a cyber-attack to target a 
hospital by turning off its electricity or taking some action to remotely taint the 
food or water supply for the civilian population.  
There are a number of reasons to categorically exclude the foregoing 
belligerent reprisals.  First, attacking these persons and objects are simply too 
inhumane and barbaric.  If IHL seeks to balance between the meta-principles 
of military necessity and humanity, the above egregious and irreversible acts 
may never been offset by necessity.  The second reason goes to the underlying 
purpose of belligerent reprisals, i.e., to induce an adversary to comply with IHL.  
The above examples will likely cause an escalation in violence by inflaming 
passions and resentments, leading additional violations of IHL and continued 
hostilities.  Third, using countermeasures as an analogy, these actions are 
neither reversible nor likely to induce a return to lawfulness.  Instead, the 
harshness of the acts make them more analogues to punishments and retaliation, 
and whether exacted in the cyber realm or not, these belligerent reprisals should 
be categorically banned.  
At the far right end of the continuum are belligerent reprisals that do not 
shock the conscience and, in the gritty world of pragmatism, are reasonable and 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????179  To some 
that take an absolutist approach to reprisals, the suggestion that there is any 
place on the continuum for belligerent reprisals is cause for great concern.  But, 
176. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 6, at 460. 
177. Mitchell, supra note 50, at 162?64.  
178. LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 60, § 18.18.3.4, at 1088. 
179. Michael A. Newton, Reconsidering Reprisals, 20 DUKE J. COMP. & INT?L L. 361, 361 
(2010). 
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even the ICRC in their 2005 Study on Customary International Humanitarian 
Law did not take the position that there is a complete ban on belligerent 
reprisals.180  Rule 145 of the Study ???????? ?Where not prohibited by 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????181
An example at this end of the spectrum may involve the use of a prohibited 
weapon against combatants or military objectives.182  For example, suppose a 
State is a party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions183 or Ottawa 
Convention184 and uses cluster munitions or antipersonnel mines as a 
belligerent reprisal against another State party.  Assuming, arguendo, that the 
other criteria for a belligerent reprisal are met, such an action is permissible.185
For somewhat obvious reasons, the parallel to countermeasures would be the 
strongest in this type of case. 
Tallinn Manual 2.0 provides a hypothetical to illustrate a lawful cyber 
operation for those States not a party to 1977 AP I.186  In the scenario, the armed 
forces of one State bomb the medical facilities of another State in the context 
of an armed conflict and the victim State is not a party to AP I.187  In response, 
and after repeated demands to cease the bombings, the Prime Minister of the 
victim State approves a cyber-attack against a power generation facility used 
exclusively to provide power to the civilian population.188  The purpose of this 
cyber reprisal operation is to compel the State which was attacking the medical 
facilities to stop.189  So long as the Prime Minister orders the cessation of cyber-
attacks as soon as the aggressive state stops attacking its medical facilities, the 
reprisal is legal according to the Tallinn Manual 2.0 experts.190
The middle of the continuum is the most important to this analysis and one 
where the employment of cyber means and methods are legitimate so long as 
their purpose is to induce an adversary to be in compliance with IHL and so 
long as they are tailored to mitigate some of negative and collateral effects.  It 
180. HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 9, at 513. 
181. Id.
182. WILLIAM H. BOOTHBY, WEAPONS AND THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 54 (2009). 
183. THE CONVENTION ON CLUSTER MUNITIONS, www.clusterconvention.org/ 
[https://perma.cc/FM5T-XBZ4] (last visited Oct. 21, 2018). 
184. Anti-Personnel Landmines Convention, UNITED NATIONS OFF. GENEVA,
www.un.org/disarmament/geneva/aplc/ [https://perma.cc/G3M3-AWNE] (last visited Oct. 21, 2018). 
185. BOOTHBY, supra note 182, at 54.  
186. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 6, at 462.  
187. Id.  
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190. Id.  The Experts did note that if the belligerent reprisal involved attacking the other State?s
medical facilities that would be considered unlawful under Tallinn Manual 2.0, Rule 108. 
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is important to reiterate that the ability to develop and execute belligerent 
reprisals in the middle of the continuum depends, in part, on whether the State 
is a party to AP I as seen in the example above.  The United States, again, is not 
a party to AP I with one of the primary reasons being the wide-ranging 
prohibitions against reprisals.191 ???? ??????? ???????? ????????? ??? ????? ?????
stemmed from its concern about what could lawfully be done immediately to 
stop an enemy State from violating IHL.192   
So, what are the likely objects a State may attack as a belligerent reprisal 
that would be considered in the middle of the continuum?  So long as a State 
meets all the criteria as outlined above in Part III,193 reprisals may include a 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
communication and transportation networks, financial markets, or energy 
sectors.194  These reprisals would need to be narrowly tailored such that they 
cause disruption, inconvenience or, in some cases, perhaps reversible non-
permanent damage to a target.195  Additionally, using a reprisal to target the 
civilian leadership of a State in order to exploit damaging personal and 
professional information may induce a State adversary to comply with IHL.  
This is a non-exhaustive list of potential targets for a cyber reprisal and are best 
viewed as illustrating the middle of the continuum.  However, what becomes 
apparent is that through the use of cyber belligerent reprisals a State can 
meaningfully enforce IHL compliance without causing repugnant and 
irreparable harm.  Of course, further discussion on the reconceptualization of 
cyber belligerent reprisals is necessary to provide greater clarity on the middle 
of the continuum.   
Viewing cyber reprisals along this continuum provides decision-makers the 
flexibility of options to respond in a lawful manner against a belligerent State 
while also remedying the shortcoming of enforcing IHL.  While belligerent 
reprisals have been generally discarded by the international community, and 
justifiably so, cyber operations warrant a re-examination of this tool for IHL 
enforcement.  A dialogue between States on this possibility would be a worthy 
endeavor.   
VII. CONCLUSION
In sum, the employment of belligerent reprisals is a course of action with 
wide-ranging implications and should never be undertaken lightly.  
191. Matheson, supra note 59, at 420.  
192. SOLIS, supra note 10, at 132. 
193. See supra notes 66?93 and accompanying text. 
194. ROSCINI, supra note 148, at 104. 
195. Id. at 106.  
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Nevertheless, they are lawful acts if approved at the highest levels of 
government with the purpose to compel an adversary to comply with IHL.  
Using this ancient enforcement mechanism provides a means to overcome the 
anemic deficiency of enforcing IHL.  Although there have been efforts to 
impose meaningful international penal sanctions in the past few decades, much 
more needs to be done during the armed conflict itself to ensure compliance.  
As illustrated in this article, cyber means and methods create opportunities to 
compel an adversary to comply with IHL while, at the same time, mitigating 
the effects of cyber operations.   
Some well-intentioned individuals and groups may summarily dismiss 
belligerent reprisals because of the horrific abuses and risks associated with 
their use.  But, viewing countermeasures as a conceptual backdrop in terms of 
purpose and limitations, the time has come to at least consider the possibilities 
at the intersection of IHL and emerging technologies.  As uncivilized, 
repugnant, and archaic as it may seem, strictly controlled reprisals may be 
justifiable as a proportionate response to the criminal acts committed by an 
adversary to prompt compliance with the law.  Emerging cyber means and 
methods may be the right tool at the right time to do just that.  
*    *    * 
 
 
